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Although Israel has often said that it
would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into
the region, Israeli officials have often publicly implied
that certain circumstances - especially the use of chemical
weapons by their enemies - would elicit a nuclear response.
In fact, evidence indicates that Israel might launch a
pre-emptive nuclear strike under certain conditions. A
critical part of Israel's nuclear strategy is the Jericho
2 missile, and some insight can be gained into the Jericho
2 and its employment by studying satellite imagery of
the missile base at Zachariah, several miles southeast
of Tel Aviv. Off-nadir viewing by satellites like the
high-resolution Indian IRS-C allows the development of
three dimensional scenes, which highlight the geological
structures that house the missile bunkers. Combined with
other imagery and advanced enhancement techniques, significant
intelligence can be gathered concerning Israel's nuclear
strategy.
The Jericho 2
Several satellite images showed the massive Jericho 2
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) during training exercises
on a small pad north of the nuclear weapon bunkers at
the missile base at Zachariah (which in Hebrew means 'God
remembers with vengeance'). The resolution makes accurate
measurement difficult, but the best estimate obtainable
suggests the missile transporter is about 16 m long, 4
m wide and 3 m high (according to reports, the missile
is 14 m long and l.5 m wide). There is no indication of
whether the TEL is wheeled or tracked, but there is no
evidence that it is on rails. The missile transporter
also has three support vehicles around it. Adjacent to
the TEL and probably connected to it by cables is a guidance
programmer and power vehicle approximately the size of
a truck. On the other side of the pad, about 10 m away,
are two other vehicles: probably a firing control vehicle
and a communications vehicle. Such a configuration would
mirror that of the Pershing II missile system deployed
by the USA in Europe and then dismantled under the INF
Treaty. This would confirm reports that Israel was very
interested in the design of the Pershing missile and aggressively
pursued US technology to build the Jericho. Although the
range of the Jericho 2 is unconfirmed, scientists have
estimated its maximum range as 5,000 km with a warhead
of 1,000 kg: enough for a nuclear weapon.
Missile base vulnerability
Although the approximately 50 Jericho 2 missiles housed
at Zachariah are formidable, an analysis of the base with
satellite imagery shows considerable weaknesses. Even
though the base was built in the 1980s, when the Soviet
Union was considered a threat, the base is vulnerable
to a modern Iranian ballistic missile nuclear strike.
The Jericho 2 missile is deployed on a lightly armoured
transporter and there is little above ground protection.
Contrary to published reports, there are no signs of missile
silos in the satellite imagery. These are distinctive,
since they have heavy silo closure doors that can withstand
a nearby nuclear blast and clear debris piled on top of
them. Instead, the missiles appear to be stored in limestone
caves under the site. If ordered to attack, the missiles
would leave their underground shelters and move to prepared
cul-de-sacs or deploy around the countryside. Clearly,
the missile base is designed to counter a launch from
Soviet-style short range missiles. According to analysts,
Israeli strategy is to immediately retaliate, before the
missile platforms are destroyed.
With a new Iranian missile threat, the
Jericho missile bases are vulnerable to a nuclear-tipped
ballistic missile such as the Shahab-3, which has a CEP
of 300 meters - accurate enough to threaten the base.
Although accuracy and the type of nuclear explosion would
determine the extent of the damage, a quick review of
the effects of a nuclear blast raise serious questions
about Jericho's ability to survive a Third World-produced
nuclear missile. If a missile containing a crude, 20 kiloton
nuclear warhead detonated 2,200 m above and 1,000 m away
from its intended target within a Jericho, the surface
target would still sustain severe damage from heat, radiation,
and blast effects. Two kilometres from ground zero, the
shock wave (at 34.5 KPa) would be powerful enough to destroy
unreinforced buildings and unprotected TELs, while the
thermal radiation (10 calories/cm2) would be enough to
ignite combustible materials. If the base were hit with
missiles having the accuracy of the Shahab-3, even reinforced
underground caves would be seriously damaged by a ground
burst.
ICBM silos like those in the USA and Russia
are designed to protect the crew and equipment from the
blast, heat and radiation damage of a nearby nuclear blast.
Constructed from above ground and then covered with dirt,
they are built using a single cement pour to provide structural
integrity and shock support and incorporate tunnels that
can survive the fracturing and ground movement sustained
by a ground burst while allowing instant access to the
surface.
The base at Jericho launch sites would
be built in a limestone region and probably use caves,
which are common to the area. An analysis of three-dimensional
imagery based on satellite data shows entrances leading
into several small hills, which have probably been hollowed
out to house the Jericho 2 and its TELs. In the case of
the two largest bunker complexes, hills surround the entrances
to the bunkers, providing a degree of protection to the
entrance. However, these caves cannot be reinforced to
provide the same blast protection as a specially built
blast- proof bunker. Even a low-yield nuclear ground blast
could fracture and shift the ground enough for tunnels
leading from the bunkers to the surface to be impassable
to TELs. Since the missile site covers an area smaller
than 6 x 4 km, just a few nuclear- tipped missiles might
neutralise Israel's missile threat and damage the nearby
bunkers holding the air force's nuclear gravity bombs.
By being vulnerable to a ballistic missile with a crude
nuclear device, Israel may be forced to launch a pre-emptive
nuclear strike rather than risk losing its ability to
respond with nuclear weapons. This vulnerability appears
to show an inertia within the Israeli military and has
serious implications for the region. Instead of reviewing
its nuclear strategy after the fall of the Soviet Union
and focusing on making a nuclear deterrent that could
survive an attack by Third World nuclear weapons, Israel
continued to focus on producing more nuclear weapons as
if envisioning a nuclear exchange with a geographically
large country.
During the Cold War both US and Soviet
leaders had numerous false indications of attacks by the
other side. In each case, the leaders waited until further
evidence showed that the launch signal was false. Part
of this willingness to wait was due to the knowledge that
their nuclear deterrent was dispersed throughout their
country and hardened against attack.
Nuclear weapon bunkers
Just to the south of most Jericho 3 launch pads are several
bunkers thought to contain nuclear gravity bombs for Israel's
attack squadrons at the Tel Nof air base just a few kilometres
to the northwest. Although some bunker dimensions vary,
five of the larger ones are about 15 m wide and 20 m long.
The above-ground height is 6 m. In all, there are 21 pads,
each with a bunker. The scarring around the site indicates
that the bunkers were built at different times, and the
condition of the roads leading to each bunker indicates
that they are all in use.
The size and number of bunkers indicates
that Israel's nuclear arsenal is larger than many estimate.
If Israel's nuclear gravity bombs are similar to those
of the USA, then their approximate dimensions are 4 m
long, 0.5 m wide and about 350 kg in weight. Assuming
the devices are stacked three high, that they are only
stored along the wall of the bunker so the bunker centre
can be used for testing and maintenance and that each
bomb is given a space of 5 m x l m x l m, then the larger
bunkers could conservatively house more than 30 weapons
each. Consequently, just the five large bunkers at this
site could alone easily store about 150 weapons. This
is more than other reports state and supports indications
that the Israeli arsenal may contain as many as 400 nuclear
weapons with a total combined yield of 50 MT (see JIR
Special Report No 14, p15).
The size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal,
the uncertainty of how it would be used and the risk of
a mistake raises many questions in the unstable Middle
East. Although Israel is the dominant conventional military
power in the region, could the vulnerability of its nuclear
force tempt the Israeli Government to launch a pre-emptive
nuclear strike against another country? There is also
the question of Israel's growing nuclear arsenal - even
though its enemies are geographically small and militarily
weaker. These questions must be answered if a serious
miscalculation is to be avoided in the future.
Israel
Ready To Strike Iran Nuclear Sites
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